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DECISIONS, NONDECISIOITS, AND IETADECISIONS
I. Introduction
The controversy over community power was wearing thin in the early 
sixties when Bachrach and Baratz seemed to breath new life into the sub­
ject with two classic papers on "nondecisionmaking" (19621963 ־). Like 
Dahl (1953)s Bachrach and Baratz objected to ”the sociological method" 
of studying community power— making inferences from positions, resources:, 
or reputations but they also objected to any alternative founded on the 
observations of contested decisions. They based their objection on the 
fact that making a decision is only one stage in the process by which 
policy is formed. Observing decisions, they conceded that one discovers 
a pluralist politics. But, they argued, no theory of power is complete 
that does not study predecision politics, in which issues are identified, 
alternative courses of action defined, and agenda decided, iiany factors 
that are unproblematic at the decision stage are of fundamental impor­
tance in predecision politics, such as the legitimacy of issues, actors, 
and tactics. They did not argue that predecision politics were in any 
way theoretically distinct: their argument rested, in fact, on the unity 
of the policy process. It is this unity that gives significance to the 
central "fact“ that, in their view, called for explanation: by the time 
an agenda is decided, only "safe“ issues remain, issues that do not 
challenge a society's existing system of inequalities, the mechanisms 
through which unequal benefits and burdens are allocated, or the values, 
beliefs, rules, practices and procedures on which these inequalities are 
based. "Important" issues, meaning redistributive issues, are not
observed at the decision stage of the process because predecision 
politics operate to suppress then. Observing the predecision process, 
what one finds, they insisted, is that the politics of ’,important" 
issues is elitist. It was the process that operates to suppress 
"important" issues to which they referred by the term "nondecisionmaking." 
The mechanisms of this process were basically two: One founded on (a 
largely potential) power that, though not visibly exercised, operated to 
suppress issues through a "law of anticipated reactions" (Friedrich,
1963); the other founded on the "mobilization of bias" (Schattschneider, 
1960), i.e., the operation of the legitimating values, beliefs, rules, 
practices and procedures of a society, which they assumed to be indis­
solubly linked with power. The combined effect of these two mechanisms 
gave to the basic institutional and social structure of a society a 
central part to play in shaping its political agenda.
On the main points, Bachrach and Baratz seemed unrebuttable: That 
decisionmaking was only one stage of the policy process, that no theory 
of power is complete that does not take into account pre-decision 
politics, that many questions that had not seemed problematic for a theory 
of decisionmaking were important, such as the legitimation of issues, 
actors, and tactics. But "nondecisions" posed a nasty problem of method: 
they are the undecided issues of a polity but there are an infinite 
number of things a polity does not decide, only some of which are sup­
pressed issues. The others were never issues to begin with. The prob­
lem was to distinguish the nonissue from the suppressed issue. Bachrach 
and Baratz provided no independent test of issueness, i.e., of the 
intensity and/or scope of a population’s preferences for change, hence 
could not empirically identify nondecisions. (See Frey, 1971; McFarland, 
1969; Ilerelman, 1963; Wolfinger, 1971.) There the subject seemed to
stick: Frey (1971) and Bachrach and Baratz themselves (1970) tried 
solving the problem, without much success. McFarland (1969) recognized 
fairly quickly that comparison provided an independent criterion of 
issueness and his solution was quickly and brilliantly applied by Crenson 
(1971). But the complexity and multicolinearity of the variables 
correlated xiith the "objective" causes of issueness, together with 
problems of cross-level inferences about issueness from aggregate measures 
and about dynamics of the process from cross-sectional analysis left 
serious problems of internal validity unsolved. (Cf Polsby, 1930, ch.11).
The new vitality that nondecisionmaking had seemed to breathe into 
the study of power quickly began to flag as tedious, tiresome controversy 
over Bachrach and Baratz's methods displaced the earlier controversy over 
"sociological" methods. The study of agendas, as a matter of fact, 
flourished— but at the expense of the framework and the problem to which 
Bachrach and Baratz had directed it. Behaviorists, the dominating force 
in empirically-oriented political science, made up for their earlier 
neglect of the subject by vigorous and systematic investigation of 
agendas (e.g., see Braybrooke,1974; Jones 1977, chs. 3-4; the first three 
papers in May and Wildavsky, 1970; Polsby, 1971; Walker, 1977). Important 
books on the subject, like Cobb and Elder’s Participation in American 
Politics (1972), were widely read, cited, and discussed. Agendas had a 
major impact on the study of international relations (see Keohane and 
Nye, 1977, who apply them brilliantly). They even became the center-piece 
of a new "paradigm" of global politics (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981).
But the study of agendas, however fruitful, is not the study of the 
politics of the suppression of issues. The controversy over the 
"suppression" of issues itself quickly took on the irreconcilable 
character of a quarrel over foundation questions— over logics of
observation and inference, the empirical status of theoretical unob­
servables, and basic conceptualizations of the nature of man and society. 
Like most such quarrels it generated a great deal of heat but very little 
light. By 1975 it seemd to achieve stalemate: Debnam (1975) insisted 
not only that propositions about nondecisions were untestable but that 
the concepts and methods of the theory were obscure and superfluous. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1975) replied that their theory was being assessed 
by the wrong kinds of criteria and came close to saying that it was good 
in itself¿ testable or not. Lukes (1975), from a quite different pers­
pective, argued that Bachrach and Baratz had not gone far enough in 
exploiting false consciousness, having yielded too much to the behavior- 
ists. Reviewing Lukes' book. Baratz (1977) turned over much the same 
ground already thoroughly plowed in the early sixties. Meanwhile, very 
little research was being done. One can count four not very compelling 
case studies— Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, Bachrach and Bergman, 1973; 
Molotch, 1970, and an earlier precursor, Vidich and Bensman, 1953— and 
only two serious, systematic investigations (Crenson, 1971, Smith, 1979).
As a result, it came to be fairly widely agreed that, although 
Bachrach and Baratz had had some insights of permanent value, their theory 
fell far short of its original promise. But this was not due to any 
overwhelming evidence against it or in favor of some alternative. It 
was due partly to criticism of their value-laden, imprecise, and cir­
cular language, partly to criticism of their methods of observation and 
inference, but most importantly to criticism of the strategy that lay 
behind their theory. It x!?as felt in some quarters, at least, that even 
if their difficulties in theory construction and method were remedied, 
their hypotheses xrould still be untestable because they rested on
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assumptions about materialism:, individual self-interest, and the nature 
(and objectivity) of conflict that were irremediably untestable.
In one sense this was true: One cannot test assumptions about the 
universality of two-person? 0-sum conflict unless one is willing to 
give up false consciousness as a convenient escape; one cannot test 
assumptions about the objectivity of conflict without begging the 
question: one cannot test highly general axioms about individual self- 
interest— they are purely tautological, asserting no more than '1people 
prefer to do what they prefer to do." At this level, conflict theory 
is irremediably untestable. But the same is true of every alternative 
strategy with which one might replace it. It is as true of behaviorism 
(or functionalism, or phenomenology, or ecology), for example, as 
"conflict theory." What must be shown is not only that Bachrach and 
Baratz rest their theory on an irremediably untestable strategy but 
that they offer nothing else. But this seems to us too strong a claim. 
All the criticisms of Bachrach and Baratz could be true— as a matter of 
fact, in; our view they are— and it could still be argued that they 
are remediable, and if remedied that Bachrach and Baratz have some 
testable hypotheses. It is this view that we take in the present paper. 
This does not mean that we claim their theory is true, what we claim, 
rather, is that the theory is corrigible.
Accordingly, our purpose in the present paper is to isolate a core 
of testable theory in Bachrach and Baratz's several works. To accomplish 
this purpose, in Part II we explicate the terms of their theory, render­
ing them more precise and removing the causal assumptions built into 
them that make them circular, and provide a method of observation and 
inference that makes the propositions built up from these terms testable.
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In Part III, we construct a specific technique, based on this method 
of observation and inference, that meets the strictest possible stan­
dards of internal validity and employ it to test a number of hypotheses 
implied in the theory.
II. An Explication of Bachrach and Baratz.
The objectives of Part II are to render the terms of Bachrach and 
Baratz's theory more precise and provide an independent test of issue- 
ness that will render a theory using them testable. Section A describes 
their theory and the strategy underlying it, section B briefly describes 
the most common objections to it; section C explicates the central terms 
of the theory and a criterion of issueness that permits their operation­
alization.
A. Bachrach and Baratz's theory.
The strategy that underlies Bachrach and Baratz's theory is founded 
on two-person, constant-sum conflict. All actors in the theory are 
rational and driven solely by self-interest. All benefits (all resources 
and rewards) are "biased”, i.e., unequally distributed; all structures of 
domination are "biased", i.e., participation in them is unequally dis­
tributed־, and the two kinds of bias are perfectly correlated. Because 
of the conflict assumption, any system can be completely described by 
the relations between two actors: we will call them A (who benefits) 
and B (who does not). The theory characterizes A and B by their loca­
tion in the system of bias. Because actors are rationally self- 
interested and the distribution of benefits is biased, the only question 
to be settled is why B does not attempt to challenge the existing system 
of inequalities. One can assume the motives of the have-nots. Challenge 
can, therefore, be taken for granted whether actually observed or not.
All questions addressed by their theory are therefore framed in terms of 
what delays or prevents change. The principal focus of the theory is on 
the behavior of A. However, because A obviously never challenges his own 
position, the behavior of A on which the theory focuses is entirely 
reactive. B, on the other hand, is both proactor and reactor. B init­
iates; A reacts, B then reacts to A's reactions.
The society of which A and B are the (only) two parts is character­
ized by the distribution of benefits among members, the manner (the 
mechanisms) in which such benefits are allocated, and the values, 
beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that create and maintain these 
mechanisms. The polity of this society consists of some authoritative 
procedure by which collective decisions are made and one or more inter­
ests with legitimate access to this authoritative procedure (hence 
1,members" of the polity). This polity is both small and unrepresentative, 
hence also "biased" (from Schattschneider, 1960), and the bias of the 
polity correlates perfectly with the biased distribution of benefits.
All members of the p'olity are A's, no B's are members.
The policy made by this polity is the outcome of a complex formative 
process. A simplification of Bachrach and Baratz's conception of this 
process is shown in figure la. The omitted details are largely irrele­
vant and this simplification is in much the same spirit as theirs 
(cf 1970, ch. 4, particularly their figure 2). The crux of this process 
is still the decision stage, at which a collective choice is made among 
alternative possible joint policies. But it is extended both backwards 
and forwards: there is a predecision stage, in which actors are deciding 
just what it is that they will decide, and a post-decision stage in which 
policy is implemented. At any stage, a polity may either do something
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or nothing with any particular issue. At the predecision stage, for 
example, the polity may decide that an issue must be decided and for­
mulate possible policies, say x, or y¿ between which• it will i ־ viiJ. 
decide; or it may not recognize an issue or not consider it political or 
not consider x or y_ among its policies. If it decides to decide between 
x and the policies x and j are the polity's agenda. If some policy, 
say x, is a challenge, and can reasonably be said to exist whether it is 
on the polity's agenda or not, it is assumed by the theory to be suppres­
sed if it is not on the agenda. Such suppressed issues are called 
nondecisions.
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
At different times, Bachrach and Baratz have defined nondecisions 
as the ,’mobilization of bias" in the interest of suppressing issues that 
threaten the status quo (1962), as keeping issues covert through the 
mobilization of bias or the use of force or power (1963), or as a 
decision by A that thwarts challenge by B (1970).^ They can occur at 
any stage of the process; Issues are most easily suppressed before they 
reach the decision stage, but they can be suppressed at the decision 
stage by tabling them, referring to committee, or prioritizing them into 
legislative oblivion and they can be suppressed at the post-decision 
stage either by not implementing policy at all or by using the discretion­
ary powers of the public bureaucracy to reshape intended policy in A's 
interests.
Bachrach and Baratz give their greatest attention to pre-decision 
politics. Figure lb shows this process in more detail. They distin­
guish (as many others do) a recognition or identification stage, in which 
some feature of a society or its situation is recognized as a "problem"
8.
that is defined as "political", i.e., something about which the polity 
can and should do something; a stage in which this "issue" is specified, 
i.e., alternative courses of action defined, objectives of such action 
identified, and the relation between alternatives and objectives estab­
lished; and finally, a stage in which some of these possible policies are 
made part of the formal agenda of the polity. An alternative preferred 
by none is not, in Bachrach and Baratz's view, a nondecision. But any 
alternative preferred by B to any on the agenda has obviously been 
nondecided. Again, this can occur at any stage of predicision politics:
It can mean not recognizing a problem that exists, or defining it as 
private; not identifying an alternative that is actually preferred; or 
not making an issue, or a preferred alternative, part of the polity’s 
agenda for decision.
Thus, at any stage of a rather complex policy process an issue can 
be either suppressed or,reshaped. In accounting for the fate of an issue, 
Bachrach and Baratz throughout think of predecision politics as an 
interactive outcome of the dual mobilization of actors A and B. The 
principal behavior of A is the "mobilization of bias". The mobilization 
of bias consists of three kinds of behavior: making rules, reinforcing 
rules, and invoking rules. It is assumed that rules made by the polity 
are biased, in fact that all rules are biased, benefiting some more than 
others. Rules are, in fact, assumed to be purely instruments of power 
and it is purely power that makes them. Because "power" in this particular 
sense means membership in the polity, and it is in the interests of the 
polity’s members that the rules are made, the bias of the rules is 
perfectly correlated with the bias of the larger system of stratification.
A, therefore, finds it always in his interest to reinforce the existing
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values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures of society which create 
and maintain this system and the ',mobilization of bias” is in fact the 
normal routine behavior of any society. Although A thus acts to reinforce 
the rules at all times, whether or not there is any immediate and concrete 
reason for doing so, the making and invoking of rules depends on what 
kinds of issues arise in the policy process.
Issues are characterized by Bachrach and Baratz in terms of their 
consequences for the existing system of bias. It is redistributive 
issues, i.e. challenges to the existing system of bias, that precipitate 
the mobilization of the values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures 
of the society so as to delay or prevent such challenges from ever 
reaching the polity's agenda. In particular, emergence of a new kind of 
actor claiming legitimate access to the polity is a challenge resisted 
by the mobilization of bias— one of the most important properties of the 
polity is its proficiency in maintaining its boundaries against encroach­
ment by nonmembers.
The principal behavior of B, of course, is challenge. At each stage 
of the policy process, B either does or does not recognize an issue, does 
or does not express his views if he does recognize it, and is or is not 
mobilized— in the resource-mobilization sense— to accomplish his objectives. 
Three factors determine B’s behavior: First, the level of resources 
available to B; second, the extent of B's dependence on A and vulner­
ability to sanctions controlled by him; and third, the legitimacy of B 
as a political actor and of the tactics available to B. In particular, 
what the mobilization of bias does from B's point of view is to define 
B's issue as criminal or subversive, delegitimate B as a political actor, 
and make the tactics available to him illegitimate.
The aggregate outcome of the A and the B processes is a self- 
maintaining system of bias. At the aggregate level, the principal 
variable is simply the likelihood that an issue or policy is in fact 
decided. One factor in this is issueness— the intensity and scope of 
preferences for some alternative to the existing policy of a polity. 
Issueness arises out of the existing bias of the distribution of benefits. 
But both the existence and the mobilization of bias operate to counteract 
the effect that the issueness of bias causes. Bias in the distribution 
of resources decreases the likelihood of mobilization for collective 
action and increases B's dependence on, and vulnerability to sanctions 
controlled by, A. Hence, challenge does not arise in the first instance 
because B does not have the resources required to mount it and even if he 
did the power-dependence relation between A and B would operate to produce 
compliance by B with easily anticipated negative reactions by A. If a 
challenge does emerge, A possesses the authority to invoke (or if necessary 
make) values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that define the 
challenge as crime or subversion, the challenger as an outsider, the 
challenger's tactics as unwarranted; and, if necessary, they justify 
forceful oppression.
The concrete details of the nondecisionmaking process depend on the 
particular stage of the policy process at which it operates. At the 
identification stage of the process, the myths and institutional practices 
of the society make most challenges (literally) unthinkable. The status 
quo, in a Berger-Luckmann-like world, acquires a facticity that removes it 
from the world of human creations and hence from a world of things which 
a polity can or should change. If B does come to recognize an issue, he 
is still not likely to voice his preferences because existing procedural
rules and institutional practices deprive him of access to the polity, he 
is vulnerable to the negative reactions he anticipates from A, and lacks 
resources to make protest effective. The same, of course, is true for 
any B: Hence, any one B must also be uncertain of support by others in 
the same position as he is, and therefore view the prospects for collec­
tive action as at best uncertain, at worst poor. If B does voice his 
views, the fact that B lacks legitimate access to the polity makes him 
vulnerable to mobilization of bias by A which, in turn, makes it 
legitimate for the state, in A's interests, to oppress B by force if he 
persists in doing so. At the specification stage of the process, an issue 
may be recognized but all the same factors operate to suppress the most 
threatening possible solutions or reshape the issue so that only "safe" 
solutions are considered. At the agenda stage of the process, the chief 
importance of the mobilization of bias lies in the decisive control it 
gives to A of the agenda procedure itself. A has the legitimate right 
to use this power to decide that an issue is not to be decided. B, who 
has no such powers, has no redress; or, more exactly, can seek redress 
only from A. (There are no disinterested agents of authority in Bachrach 
and Baratz's world.) Thus, the process is hermetically sealed unless 
some exogenous force disrupts it: the values, beliefs, rules, practices 
and procedures of society create and maintain the mechanisms through 
which benefits are allocated; these mechanisms create, and subsequently 
operate to reproduce, the existing distribution of benefits; the existing 
distribution of benefits creates the interests that motivate the making, 
reinforcing, and invoking of rules which operate to maintain the existing 
mechanisms of allocation, hence the existing distribution of benefits.
B. Criticisms of Bachrach and Baratz’s theory.
Criticisms of Bachrach and Baratz's theory are of three kinds: 
criticisms of the way it defines it central terms, of the conflict 
assumptions underlying them, and their operationalization, hence 
testability.
The criticisms of its central terms, and particularly of "non- 
decisions," are legion: they are value-loaded, imprecise, ambiguous, 
circular. Bachrach and Baratz define words after the fashion of Samuel 
Johnson, whose dictionary, for example, defined an excise tax as a 
"hateful tax...levied by wretches." They have a predilection for rich, 
evocative language that not only stretches the word "bias" to cover 
virtually every feature of institutional and social structure, but also 
uses "nondecision" ambiguously to refer sometimes to an event (a deci­
sion intended to suppress an issue), sometimes to an outcome (the issue 
suppressed), and sometimes to a process (nondecisionmaking as distinct 
from nondecision). (See particularly Bachrach and Baratz, 1970 and their 
discussion of Debnam's "errors of interpretation"' in Bachrach & Baratz, 
1975.) The confusion of meaning is exaggerated by the kind of primitive 
terms used to define nondecisions: it is defined by other terms, like 
"the mobilization of bias" or the "importance" of issues that are as 
much in need of explication as nondecision itself. (Frey, 1971; 
McFarland: 1969; TJolfinger, 1971). They also have a predilection for 
condensing whole theories in a word. To define nondecision as the 
mobilization of bias in the interest of suppressing issues that 
threaten the status quo, or as keeping an issue covert by using bias, 
power, or force, or as a decision that suppresses issues that threaten 
the interests of decision-makers makes any theory using the term
circular. In two cases the effect is defined by its causes, in one the 
cause is defined by its effects. (The same difficulty afflicts Frey's 
otherwise very intelligent defense and reformulation of Bachrach and 
Baratz— see Frey, 1971. He ends with a definition in terms of power 
both as cause and criterion of suppressed issues.
Many objections to the terms of the theory have been not so much to 
circularity itself, however, as to the kind of theory implicit in the 
causes (or effects) condensed in them: that all conflicts are two-person, 
constant-sum conflicts, that group decisionmaking can be thought of as 
dyadic interpersonal power, that the behavior of any polity is completely 
driven by pure self-interest. There are no disinterested parties, no 
group interest, and the interests of the parties at conflict are always 
diametrically opposed. To the extent that one takes these claims not as 
tautological axioms of a strategy but as matters of empirical fact, critics 
have not been willing to accept them as realistic depictions of communi­
ties, objecting that there may be more than two interests and some people 
may be indifferent (Merelman, 1963). Nor have they been willing to accept 
the assumption that the mobilization of bias depends purely on self- 
interest (Merelman, 1968: Wolfinger, 1971). And objections to dyadic 
conceptions of the polity have of course been common (cf Lehman, 1969 or 
Nagel, 1975). It would be equally unrealistic to assume there is no 
conflict in a community. But the two extremes are not the only possi­
bilities: a conflict with n parties and a mixture of competitive and 
cooperative motives is probably more realistic than either perfect con­
flict or perfect consensus.
But the most serious objections to the concept of "nondecisions" 
have had to do with testability. Because there are an infinite number
of things a polity does not decide, a testable theory of nondecisions 
must provide some line of demarcation between the suppressed issue and 
the nonissue— the matter in which no one has an interest. This requires 
a definition of "issue" that is independent both of the position of an 
issue in the decision process and its eventual fate, !!either of Bachrach 
and Baratz’s methods of observation and inference satisfy this require­
ment. They rely on inferring the interests of members of a polity either 
from its distribution of benefits or from its system of values, beliefs, 
rules, practices, and procedures. The first method relies heavily on 
the ability of an outside, objective observer to validly infer the value 
of benefits to members. Use of the method has led, in Frey’s view for 
example, to the foundering of the whole subject on conflicts over 
implicit and contestable value judgments (Frey, 1971). The second method 
is problematic because it is no simple matter to assess the norms and 
values of a society and in any case it begs the question to assume they 
are equivalent to the interests of members. The strongest objections of 
all have been to the assumption that if these methods do not yield con­
clusions consistent with the behavior of the members of a polity this 
is explained by false consciousness, itself a form of nondecision.
Except for Lukes (1975), who thinks Bachrach and Baratz do not rely on 
it enough, false consciousness has been rejected by almost everyone as 
untestable in principle.
C. Explication of the central terms in Bachrach and Baratz’s theory.
Our purpose is to render the terms in Bachrach and Baratz’s theory 
more precise, and to rid them of pejorative evaluations and the appeal to 
causes and effects which makes them circular. To accomplish the required 
definitions, we assume quite conventional concepts of what a decision is,
i.e.j a choice anon¿ alternatives, and what a collective decision is, 
i.e., an authoritative decision, however arrived at, that binds all 
members of a group, independent of their individual preferences. (Col­
lective decisions, for our purposes, can be made by any kind of mechan­
ism whatever— dictatorship, committee, majority vote, unanimous consensus 
or any other binding procedure.) The set of all issues to be decided by 
this procedure is the group's political agenda. The simplest agenda 
consists of one issue and the simplest issue consists of one set of 
mutually exclusive^ independent alternatives. Thus simple agendas can be 
completely described by the set of alternatives, or policies, among 
which the group will decide. A more complex issue is a composite of 
several independently decidable simple issues. In this case, the idea 
of an agenda requires the additional notion that some order is imposed 
on the several subissues, i.e., they are to be taken up in some predeter­
mined sequence. However, this idea, which is central in studies of the 
effects the agenda has on the outcomes of collective decisionmaking 
(Cohen, et al., 1970j Fiorina and Plott, 1978; Levine and Plott, 1977, 
Plott and Levine, 1973; Plott and Rogerson, 1979) plays no role in our 
attempt to explicate Bachrach and Baratz. Actual agendas, of course, 
will often consist of more than one issue, again in some order that is 
irrelevant for present purposes.
The agenda is merely one stage in the process by which a group 
decides on a policy. We take the simplified variant of Bachrach and 
Baratz's model of the policy process in figures la and lb to adequately 
describe the stages in the •process as a whole. The "stages" of!this model 
are not necessarily temporally distinct. They are simply analytic 
distinctions referring to various aspects of the process and arranged in
logical order— logical in the sense that one cannot specify an issue one 
has not recognizeds cannot decide an issue one has not decided to decide, 
etc. But all of them could occur almost instantaneously, from a temporal 
point of viexi, and any stage can be retraced any number of times once the 
process begins. All that part of the process which ends in an agenda we 
will refer to as the metadecision stage of the process¡, i.e., the stage 
in which decisions are made about decisions; deciding what to decide is 
what predecision politics is essentially about.
The progress of an issue to decision, described by figure 2, begins 
with the recognition that something is a "problem1' about which the group, 
as a group, should do something. To decide what might be done requires 
specification of the issue, i.e., conceiving alternative solutions, their 
possible outcomes, and the relations between these two. The agenda 
selects some at least of the possible policies as the "issue" which must 
be decided, and it is this issue, as defined by the agenda, that is in 
fact the framework for collective decision. The elements that survive 
at each stage of the process form, in a sense, its positive outcomes.
At this pointa like Bachrach and Baratz, we require some idea of issueness 
if we are to define the meaning of its negative outcomes. Me take the 
liberty of presuming a solution exists to the question of what makes some 
state of affairs an issue, a question dealt with (at length) below. If 
we assume we have something we know to be an issue, obviously the simplest 
way to define a nondecision is to recognize that at any stage of the 
process (including the decision stage) there is always the possibility 
of doing nothing (cf Dahl, 1957, p. 209). At the identification stage 
an issue may simply not be recognized, or it may be seen as only a private 
matter. At the specification stage some alternative may simply not be
considered. At the agenda stage agenda gatekeepers may decide not to 
decide an issue or, what comes to the same thing, may simply not decide 
to decide it. Thus,
DEFINITION 1. A nondecision is any outcome of a metadecision 
process such that
(1) there is an issue in the polity, that
(2) the polity has not decided to decide.
Ue call attention again to the fact that there are two ways that a 
nondecision can occur. A group can actually decide not to decide an issue. 
Or it can simply not decide to decide it. In the latter case, there may 
be no visible decision to point to as a nondecision, but providing the 
first part of the definition is satisfied, i.e., the issue meets some 
standard (to be provided below) of issueness, then it makes no difference 
whether or not an explicit ־ decision is made to not consider the issue.
Host of the special features of the metadecisionmaking process arise from 
this fact.
The definition of a nondecision obviously depends for its usefulness 
on a definition of the term "issue." The definition of "issue" is com­
plicated by shifts that tend to occur in the sense of the term at different 
stages of the policy process. At the earliest stage of the process, when 
what is in question is recognition of the issue, the term will often be 
used to mean that someone has identified a "problem" that they feel calls 
for group decision. The word "problem", in turn, x^ ill usually mean that 
there is some disparity between an existing state of affairs and some 
person's preferences. The problem may be quite vaguely defined, the person 
recognizing it having little idea what might be done about it, hence what 
alternatives an agenda might consider. As the "problem" comes to be
defined, i.e., the issue comes to be specified further, it will acquire 
much greater definition: Alternative courses of action will be conceived, 
their outcomes identified, information will be sought and some will be 
provided about the relation between each alternative and the various 
possible outcomes of a decision. Possibly, though not necessarily, people 
will acquire some goals or objectives in terms of which they can decide 
which alternatives are preferred; in any case, they will form preferences 
for the various alternatives based on preferences for the outcomes to 
which they are relevant. In this stage, the word "issue" tends to mean 
"controversy", i.e., a matter with respect to which different people have 
different preference orders for different possible policies. In both 
senses of the word, it is usually assumed that the issue has not yet been 
authoritatively decided; even if one disagrees with the outcome of a 
collective decision, one does not refer to it as still an "issue" unless 
one does not accept the decision as authoritative. To create an "issue" 
it will also be necessary-that policies ordered by the members nca.jcrr, 
are mutually exclusive. If they are not, obviously no choice is required.
In order to define an "issue", therefore, one must be able to 
characterize people by their preference-ordering for different policies. 
One can think of such preference orders in more or less the usual way: 
the outcomes of each possible policy must have some kind of value for 
people affected by them which induces a preference order on the outcomes; 
the preference order on the outcomes, in turn, induces one on the alter­
natives linked to them. (We can neglect the probabilistic case because 
it affects only the kind of decision rule employed, which is irrelevant 
to defining an issue for present purposes.) To define the difference 
between two such preference orders we obviously require some notion of
their similarity. We will say that two preference orders are the same
if and only if they are made up of the same policies in the same order.
This implies, for example, not only that x > y > z is different from
x < y < z, it is also different from x > y . Thus, it is sufficient to
make nuclear arms policy an issue if one segment of the community prefers
unilateral nuclear disarmament while another does not even consider the
alternative a possibility to be debated. Indifference among alternatives
xve will count as a preference order that is consistent with every other
preference order— hence, raises no issue. However, this way of thinking
about the difference between two preference orders does not require that
every alternative be well-defined. For example, x > x is a different
preference order from x < x , without x having to be a well-defined policy
in the minds of the actor. Thus, the desire for something; anything,
different from present policy is a meaningfully different preference order
This will be true even if every member of the polity shares the same
preference order. The difference that makes an "issue" is, in this case,
the difference between x > x , implicit in the existing policy x, and the
order x > x preferred by dissenting members of the polity. We will there-
2fore define an issue as:
DEFINITION 2. A present (or prospective) state of affairs is an 
Issue in a polity if and only if
(1) there are two or more distinct preference orders for the 
outcomes of a collective decision,
(2) the outcomes ordered by these preferences are mutually 
exclusive,
(3) and policy has not been authoritatively decided in the 
minds of those who have a stake in the outcome.
iiote, of course׳, that covert issues are still issues by this 
definition. It also implies that the reshaping of issues in the course 
of debate is nondecisionmaking just as much as complete suppression of 
an issue is. (This, of course, is consistent with Bachrach and Baratz, 
as it is intended to be.) The "shape" of an issue can be described in 
terms of (1) how "political" it is seen to be (as opposed to how "private" 
it is); (2) the set of alternatives considered, and (3) the set of out­
comes perceived as the consequences of these alternatives. Thus, one 
individual may see health care as a technical issue and think of it in 
terms of costs, efficiencies, and effectiveness. Another may define it 
in terms of changes in the relations between the private and public sec­
tor, hence define the issue in terms of private vs social medicine.
Still others may not even consider national health insurance among the 
possible alternatives. Ue will use the term "issue" throughout to mean 
a specific ordering of specific alternatives and outcomes, hence modify­
ing in any way the alternatives or the outcomes considered counts as a 
redefinition or reshaping of the issue.
One can describe positions on an issue by describing the distribu­
tion and intensity of these preferences in a population. Its "issueness" 
is a question of the scope and intensity of these preferences. But 
preferences are purely subjective and subjective preferences are unobser­
vables. Thus, definitions 1 and 2 may make the concept of a nondecision 
more precise, but unless an independent test of issueness is found it is 
still incapable of figuring in testable theories. If an issue is not on 
a polity's agenda, what ground is there for inferring that it is an issue?
Definitions 1 and 2 imply that nondecisions are essentially counter- 
factual agendas— issues that, in the absence of some countervailing
22. :1 .
factor would have been on the polity's agenda. I ,hat has to be shown is 
that, other things being equal, the issue would have emerged. The com­
parative method is the conventional solution to such problems (and is 
used in the nondecision literature, for example, by Crenson, 1971 and 
Smith, 1979). Comparing otherwise similar polities, a variable X can be 
said to cause a nondecision if and only if the issue is present when X 
is absent. It may be difficult to accomplish the comparison: Polities 
have to be equated both for factors relevant to the creation and formula­
tion of issues and for otherwise extraneous factors correlated with the 
behavior of the polity. But in principle there is nothing mystical about 
the inference that needs to be made. The operational definition of a 
nondecision depends on:
CRITERION 1: An issue not on a polity’s agenda is a nondecision 
if and only if, in the absence of some identifiable 
factor X» the issue is on the agenda of otherwise 
similar polities.
The syntax of the rule is slightly tortured because it provides a 
rule identifying a state (nondecision) rather than the factor that causes 
it (X) . A deceptive consequence is that the syntax emphasizes a negative 
test (the absence of X)• Its most important implication is in fact more 
positive: What one is really looking at is not something called the 
”nondecisionmaking process'* but rather the metadecisionmaking process as 
a whole. To refer to the process one is studying as the "nondecision" 
process, as Bachrach and Baratz often do, means one is not looking at 
positive outcomes— an error the mirror opposite of the one Bachrach and 
Baratz criticized in formulating the concept in the first place. Just as 
Bachrach and Baratz underlined the unity of the entire policy process, 
Criterion 1 underlines the unity of the metadecision process. The positive
outcomes (agendas) and the negative outcomes (nondecisions) cannot be 
studied as two separate kinds of process, they are inseparably part of 
the one process. Thus, research on ”nondecisionmaking" cannot focus solely 
on factors suppressing an issue and cannot be concerned with nondecisions 
per se.
If ”nondecisions" were ambiguous, circular, and value-loaded, 
"mobilization of bias" is more so. The solution, however, is simpler to 
arrive at. Going back to its origins in Schattschneider, the term ,'bias'1 
referred to inequalities in the allocation of values and in participation 
in making policy and rules. It gradually acquired the meaning, in 
addition, of a "bias" in the mechanisms that operated to allocate these 
values, hence, in the end, also of the values, rules, practices and 
procedures that operated to create and maintain these mechanisms. Only if 
one assumes, as Bachrach and Baratz do, that all these form a single mono­
lithic structure can one refer to all this by the one concept. But what 
is at work» clearly, is the legitimation process, and what Bachrach and 
Baratz (and Schattschneider) think is the key to that process is the system 
of values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures to be found in a 
society. Hence, without attempting a formal definition of the expression 
(despite our frequent use of it in part III), we will simply use the term 
to refer to "legitimacy", and follow Bachrach and Baratz in thinking of 
legitimacy as created by the existing values, beliefs, norms and practices 
of a society.
III. Testing Bachrach and Baratz's theory: The Politics of the Suppression
of issues.
Our purpose in part III is to construct a specific technique, based 
on the method of observation and inference proposed in part II, that meets
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the strictest possible standard of interna], validity and to employ it to 
test seven hypotheses implied by Bachrach and Baratz's theory.
A. Scope of This Investigation.
Throughout, we test this theory under the following conditions:
First, the groups we study are engaged in collective, interdependent tasks 
and have a procedure capable of making authoritative, collective decisions. 
Second, we focus throughout on the agenda stage of the policy process. In 
some sense, we are concerned with the mobilization of resources; what the 
agendas are about is a change the costs of which are to be born by members 
of the group. But the focus is on the point at which a member of the 
group initiates an agenda. Third, all the agendas we study are member- 
initiated. In this we follow Bachrach and Baratz, but it should be em­
phasized that the agenda of any group can arise in a number of other ways. 
Some issues arise exogenously— not only in the sense that they are about 
the external environment of the group but also in the sense that the ex­
ternal environment establishes a group’s agenda. (Meyer, for example, 
emphasizes how many features of educational and political systems arise 
not because they serve any purpose from the point of view of the group 
itself but because external sources of support and resources think a 
group legitimate only if it has such features. See, particulary, Meyer, 
1977). Some issues arise endogenously, but out of the routines evolved 
by the group for accomplishing its purposes and sustaining its existence. 
Thus, Polsby (1971) distinguishes inside from outside initiatives on the 
basis of a distinction between governmental vs nongovernmental sources of 
an issue and Cobb, et al., (1976) make this distinction the basis for three 
distinct models of agenda-setting. In Polsby*s language, we are concerned 
in the present investigation only with "outside" initiatives. However,
"outside” 1c slightly ambiguous: From the perspective of the literature 
on social movements, we are entirely concerned with "insiders'" politics. 
Although we study challenges, there are no "outsiders” in our groups in 
the sense of persons without legitimate access to the polity. Fourth, we 
study n-person, mixed-motive conflicts. In this respect, we depart 
sharply from Bachrach and Baratz, whose definition of a nondecision commits 
them to a dyadic conflict model. The way in which we have redefined the 
term makes no such a. priori commitment. This is not because we think such 
conflicts never occur. But as a starting point they neglect too much.
The principal application Bachrach and Baratz make of their theory is to 
the politics of communities. In effect, what their assumption does is 
focus entirely on the distributive aspects of a community's politics.
They treat polities as if they either had no corporate existence or all 
agents of that corporate existence were coopted by economic elits. Pos­
sibly some communities have no corporate existence and possibly some 
polities are coopted by economic elites, but both characteristics vary 
across polities. Furthermore, with respect specifically to the distribu­
tive aspects of politics they also assume that every single individual is 
in some way affected by every redistributive issue which seems to us much 
too strong. Only in the limit would one expect to find no disinterested 
parties to a conflict. Thus, the redistributive issue that x^ e create in 
the laboratory makes room for a mixture of cooperative as well as compet­
itive and disinterested as well as interested motives.
B. Techniques of Investigation.
Any weight given to "realism" may seem odd in an investigation that 
creates redistributive issues in the laboratory. But one purpose of our 
method is to achieve the highest possible standard of internal validity.
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Non experlinen 1:al comparisons such as Crenson (197.1) or Smith (1979) 
obviously satisfy the criterion laid down in part II. But even comparative 
studies have been plagued by serious difficulties of internal validity.
These difficulties are essentially the same as those pointed out by Snyder 
(1979) in studies of collective violence. Polsby (19G0, Ch. 11), for 
example, has criticized Crenson, the exemplar for this kind of study, 
because he arbitrarily assumes that objective conditions can have only one 
subjective meaningr-which is exactly like trying to infer relative depriva­
tion from changes in GNP. Snyder (1979) identifies the problems of such 
inferences as due partly to inferring cross-level effects from measures at 
only the aggregate level, partly to inferring process from cross-sectional 
causal models, and partly to the numerous factors incorporated into ag­
gregated indicators besides the concepts they are taken to indicate.
Crenson, for example, was in the fortunate position of having an objective 
measure of pollution. Holding other relevant factors constant, he found 
that as the particulate level in the air increased the issueness of pol­
lution increased. But holding the particulate level constant, as concen­
tration of economic power increased the issueness of pollution decreased. 
Crenson inferred that the issue had been suppressed. Polsby objected that 
Crenson was in no position to rule out the rival hypothesis that the popula­
tions of such communities do not want pollution ordinances because they 
trade off clean air for employment and commercial opportunities. However 
objective the measure of air pollution is, issueness is a subjective state 
of mind. There is no warrant for directly inferring issueness from any 
objective indicator׳ other factors, correlated with but distinct from both 
the objective measure and the hypothetical suppressant, may also determine 
the meaning of the indicator.
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A method by which a stricter standard of internal validity can be 
achieved is experimentation. Our objective in using this method is to 
create an unambiguous instance of a redistributive issue that no one can 
claim is not "really" an issue. To accomplish this requires the 
capacity to manipulate the conditions that create an issue, to control (or 
to randomize) the effects of factors that might confound its interpreta­
tion, and to almost completely control the conditions of its observation.
To create a redistributive issue in a laboratory setting, rewards are 
distributed inequitably to groups having the capacity to change the 
structure that creates the inequity: Five-member teams are required to 
solve ten (independent) problems the solution to each of which depends on 
coordinating information distributed to members at the beginning of the 
problem in such a way that each has some but no one has all the informa­
tion required to solve it. Subjects (S’s) work in separate rooms, 
communicating by written messages only. Messages can pass only to those 
other members of the team linked to S by "open" channels of communication 
(from Bavelas, 1950). All teams start in the most highly centralized 
network possible, called the "wheel". (See figure 2A.)
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE)
This structure has one central and four peripheral positions. The 
central position can communicate directly with all the others, but all 
the others communicate only with (or through) the center. The central 
position is also materially advantaged: although each S gets some share 
of the team’s total earnings, which depend on the number of correct 
solutions to each problem, there is also a bonus paid on each problem 
to the member who first reports the correct solution to the experimenter 
(E). (The value of this bonus equals the value of the team’s earnings
on one problem if all its solutions are correct.) It will of course 
always be earned by the central position. To underline the inequity of 
this, S’s are told early in their instructions that all of them are alike 
and were allocated to their positions by chance. But a team is allowed 
to add more channels of communication if it is willing to pay a small 
cost, to be shared by all members (Mackenzie, 1976). An all-to-all 
network, for example, (shoxra in figure 2B), would equalize opportunity to 
win a bonus. To add more channels, a majority of the group must agree.
An "election", to decide the issue, is held by E if a member of the group 
(1) proposes a specific agenda and (2) obtains a second by one other 
member. Thus, from the point of view of any given disadvantaged 
(peripheral) member, the problem is to mobilize the resources of his 
peers to accomplish a change that restores equity. From the point of 
view of any given advantaged (central) member, the problem is to suppress 
the issue— a capacity within his powers because he controls communication. 
Wo election is actually held: each S is stopped and interviewed at the 
point at which a proposal to change the structure is first made or 
endorsed. Where required, S is placed in E's "office” where, in addition 
to responsibility for calculating team earnings and allocating the bonus,
S is asked to function as an agenda gatekeeper. In any one experiment,
S's are placed in only one position in this structure; all other 
positions play roles pre-programmed by E, so that each of the roles in 
the process can be studied for given conditions of their joint relation­
ship. Hence, we have two kinds of studies to report, one concerned with 
how powerful beneficiaries behave (Section C below) and the other with 
how less powerful and deprived actors behave (Section D below).
In all experiments using these methods, a 'baseline” condition 
measures the magnitude of the pressure created by the inequitable alloca­
tion of the bonus to change the structure of the communication network. 
Other things being equal, almost half the S's in the "peripheral" posi­
tions of the wheel have tried to get another member of the group to 
endorse a proposal to change the structure of the communication network 
by the end of the third problem (or "trial" of the experiment). By the 
end of the tenth trial, 30% of S's have responded in this way, which is 
referred to as a "change-", or simply "C-", response. (Figure 3 shows 
the distribution of such responses in the form of a survival curve, i.e. 
the percentage surviving at the end of each trial of the experiment.)
A disinterested agenda gatekeeper, placed in the ,,office" of the experi­
ment, will endorse such an agenda 95% of the time. (See table 1 below.)
(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE)
But what is the cost to external validity of this kind of method? In 
general, an answer to this kind of question depends on the purpose to 
which an experiment is addressed. The purpose of an experiment is to 
test an abstract, general, explanatory hypothesis (cf Zelditch, 1969); it 
should be understood that that is the purpose of the present investiga­
tion— it is not our purpose to say anything descriptive about raetadeci- 
sionmaking in particular, concrete communities. Given our purpose, 
standards of external validity applied to experiments are the same as 
those applied to generalizing from nonexperimental investigations. Gen­
eralization from any instance to any other depends on successfully 
abstracting the relevant variables common to both. There are two ways in 
which external validity in this sense can fail: The theory employed 
can fail because of specification errors, i.e. it may omit some
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relevaxit variable; or one (or both) of the instances nay not be valid 
instances of the theory. In the case of experiments, specification 
errors may themselves be of two kinds. The theory tested may omit an 
important factor which is therefore not incorporated into the experiment­
al setting employed to test it. Or the theory fails to recognize the 
significane of an important factor which jLs incorporated into the setting 
used to test it, treating as theoretically irrelevant factors that 
actually determine the outcome. Of particular importance in guiding the 
construction of an experimental setting is the precise theoretical speci­
fication of the nature of the relations between variables. Since very 
often the effects produced by experiments in the laboratory occur during 
short periods of time at low levels of involvement through small ranges 
of the theoretically relevant variables, one's theory must assure one 
that the process is merely magnified, but not changed in form, over 
longer periods, in more involving conditions, at more extreme values of 
the same variables. This is, of course, the standard kind of objection 
to experiments in sociology. But it is important to understand that 
what does not matter is the fact that an experiment will not match the 
descriptive generalizations made about natural settings. That is 
precisely what they are created not to do. Generalizing the result of 
any experiment (or, for that matter, any non experiment) is conditional. 
Extrapolating it to a natural setting is possible if and only if pre­
cisely the same initial and scope conditions are reproduced by the 
natural setting. The experiment guarantees only the relation "if x, then 
y," never the fact of x in a natural setting. It is because of this that 
one should not, except for occasional and unpredictable accidents, 
directly extrapolate the results of any one experiment to any concrete
natural setting. The function of the experiment is to inform the 
experimenter about an aspect of a theory. It will never test the 
whole theoretical formulation, because its entire function is to isolate 
and manipulate particular parts of the theory while controlling other 
parts of it. The proper way to relate an experiment to a natural 
setting, therefore, is to apply the theory to which it is relevant to 
the natural setting. Failures of external validity are therefore as 
often failures of theory as they are failures of validity. In assessing 
the external validity of the present experiments, what one wants to look 
for are first of all the success with which the experiment creates the 
variables abstracted by the theory. In case the obvious needs explicit 
statement, note that application of the theory to natural settings is 
both an important criterion of its utility and one not guaranteed by 
experiment.
C. Studies in the causes of the mobilization of bias.
In Bachrach and Baratz's theory the principle behavior of the "haves" 
is the mobilization of bias to delay or prevent challenges from reaching 
the agenda for decision. This behavior includes two kinds of events, 
making new rules and invoking existing ones. The theory treats the 
invoking of existing rules as a multiplicative interaction between 
interest and legitimacy (given power). Failing an interest, there is 
nothing impelling anactor to use the rules. Failing legitimacy, there 
are no rules to invoke. In the latter case, assuming the power of the 
actor to make rules, a different model of the mobilization of bias pre­
dicts his behavior: The mobilization of bias will lead to the elabora­
tion of the given system of rules for the purpose of justifying the 
interests of the powerful. In either case, given a vested interest 
there are strong pressures to prevent change by making it counternorma-
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tive. Lacking such an interest, there are no: pressures either to use 
or to make rules.
To test this model, 33 male, undergraduate, paid volunteers were 
seated in a room labelled "office", where they were instructed to tabu­
late the number of correct solutions, team earnings, and bonuses for a 
team at work in the setting described in section B. They were also 
given responsibility for deciding whether to hold an election or not if 
members wished to rent more channels of communication. Thus, the 
office held veto power over any agenda for change. A confederate sent 
a proposal for change (to an all-to-all network) on the third trial of 
the experiment. A "change-response" in this experiment consists of 
endorsement of this proposal by the agenda gatekeeper.
In the baseline condition of the experiment, S was paid a flat fee 
for his participation. Under this condition, 95% of S's made a 
C-response (see the first row of table 1). A vested interest in the 
existing structure was created, in a second condition, by making S's 
rewards depend on how much the central position earned. More exactly, 
S’s were told that introducing a bonus complicated the problem of pay­
ing the office, but they would be paid an amount equal to the highest 
individual earnings in the work team. This substantially decreased 
C-responses; only 60% of S׳s endorsed the confederate’s proposal to 
change to an all-to-all network in this condition. Legitimacy was 
created, in a third condition, by allowing S to hear instructions given 
by E to the work team explaining that it would damage the objectives of 
the experiment if members changed the existing structure before the 
eigth problem because it took that long before the behavior being 
studied in the experiment could be reliably measured. Like S's in the
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baseline condition, these S's were paid a flat fee for participation 
and had no vested interest in the kind of communication system used 
by the work team־ Under these conditions, only 35% of S’s made a 
C-response. That the legitimacy effect is stronger than the interest 
effect is not informative, because the 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
two manipulations are arbitrarily sampled points from two multi-valued 
variables; other values of these variables, had they been sampled 
instead, would have produced stronger (or weaker) effects. What I¿ 
significant is that legitimacy has an effect that does not depend on 
interest. An even more clear evidence of the independence of legiti­
macy from interest is shown by the fourth condition of the experiment, 
in which interest and legitimacy combine to reduce the level of 
C-responses to 15% (see the last row of table 1). Legitimacy and 
interest are evidently additive, not interactive. The rate of change 
is the lowest of the four conditions, of course, but is no lower than 
one would predict simply by adding the effect of legitimacy to that of 
interest.
Justification for this conclusion rests on the "logit analysis" 
shown in the right-hand columns of table 1. Logit analysis is basic­
ally linear regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. The 
"parameters" shown in column 5 are logs of the ratio of the proportion
of change-responses to the proportion resisting change. The parameter
4for the interaction effect is not significantly different from zero.
What these results imply is that legitimacy has an effect on the 
behavior of the agenda gatekeepers whether or not there is any self- 
interested motive for "mobilizing" it and the effect it has is the 
same whether there is an interest or not— i.e. the existence of a
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vented interest does not multiply the legitimacy effect. This is 
not the kind of proposition which one accepts or rejects on the basis 
of a single experiment; bat the experiment does give one reason to 
doubt Bachrach and Baratz's reduction of legitimacy to a purely material 
basis.
D. Studies in the effects of "the mobilization of bias."
In this section we consider six hypotheses deriving from Bachrach 
and Baratz that have to do with the effects, as distinct from the 
causes, of the mobilization of bias. These effects are of three kinds: 
direct effects of legitimacy on the acceptance of, and hence voluntary 
compliance with, a normative order; indirect effects of the acceptance 
by others of a normative order as legitimate: and direct effects of 
the authority conferred by legitimacy, which, by justifying the 
collective mobilization of members' resources, concentrates the power 
required to enforce unwilling compliance with a normative order on 
those who do not accept it.
To study these effects, S's were put in the peripheral positions 
of the centralized network shown in figure 2A. The results of six 
experiments with various ways of manipulating the legitimacy of a 
normative order or its authority are displayed in table 2. The first 
line in the body of this table shows the result of a direct attempt to 
make inequality appear legitimate, i.e. equitable. To accomplish this,
E informed S’s that all of them had been randomly allocated to positions 
in the network except for the central person, who had been specially 
chosen (on the basis of previous experiment) for superior ability at 
the task. In the baseline condition of this experiment, 95% of S's 
made a C-response some time during the experiment. In the equity
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condition, only 62% did. Thus, one might say that a third of the 
change observed in the baseline condition was suppressed by legitima­
ting inequality. The observed proportion of C-responses, however, is 
a seriously misleading statistic. It does not distinguish faster from 
slower rates of change, differences which are observable only by 
displaying entire survival curves (as in figure 3). The same is true 
of the meanormedian of these curves. ,!•That table 2 shows, therefore, 
is a statistic that more precisely reflects the differences in shape of 
the two survival curves being compared. It is based on the ratio of 
the relative rates of change in the equity treatment compared to its 
baseline condition,“* and can be read "the percent of change in the base­
line condition that is delayed or prevented by the treatment in the 
experimental condition." It is adapted from a statistic used to 
evaluate clinical trials in medical experiments. By this measure, the 
justification of inequality by E delayed or prevented 63% of the change 
found in the baseline condition.(Lineweber, et al, 1930).
An even stronger effect was produced simply by labelling the issue 
illegitimate. This was done by making S's believe that it would damage 
the objectives of the experiment if a change were actually made. S’s 
were told that E was interested in the "detailed pattern of information 
flow" in communication networks of various kinds, that this pattern did 
not stabilize, and therefore could not be reliably measured, before the 
eighth problem, and that E would return at the end of the eighth problem 
in order to measure this flow. This delayed or prevented 67% of the 
change observed in the baseline (Thomas, et al, 1930).
As one might expect, making change politically impossible eliminated 
it completely. TIhat we were trying to create, in this case, is some­
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thing like the facticity of a normative order that Bachrach and Baratz, 
like Berger and Lucknann, believe it acquires by being upheld by others. 
Whether or not any given individual accepts the legitimacy of an order, 
that it comes to be embodied in everyone's conduct gives it an unques­
tioned reality that makes other possibilities vanish. Not only does 
"how it is done" become a fact of nature instead of a fallible human 
creation, hence unthinkable as a "political" issue, but it breaks well- 
beaten paths that channel behavior as effectively as if the paths not 
there were actual barriers. To make change politically impossible, we 
eliminated the rental procedure. The only difficulty was to devise 
a dependent variable comparable to that in the baseline. For this 
purpose we observed individualistic as well as collective change- 
responses. Adding more channels of communication is a response to 
inequity that requires collective mobilization of resources. Some S's 
in all our experiments find this a "hassle" and, instead, attempt 
directly to negotiate a share of the bonus on an individual basis or 
withhold, or send false, information. (The proportion of change- 
responses that is individualistic varies from experiment to experiment. 
We do not study it here because it does not bear on Bachrach and 
Baratz's theory.) Howeyei¿.ttoamake the responses ihaail six experi- 
ments-'compdrable we include both individualistic and collective 
change-responses in all the results shown in Table 2. The political 
impossibility of change delayed or prevented 43% of changes (of all 
kinds) observed in the baseline. More important, no S in the experi­
mental condition thought of the possibility of collectively changing 
the structure of the system of communication. All of the suppressed 
change was due to the difference in collective change-responses; the 
rate of individualistic change-responses was about the same in both
3G. ־.
conditions. Or, put another way, the political impossibility of 
change did not seem to substantially increase private grievances 
(Thomas, et al, 1981).
The effect of legitimacy in Bachrach and Barat2 does not depend on 
S's own beliefs in the legitimacy of a normative order. The beliefs 
of others play a central role in delaying or preventing change. In 
fact, although they do not use the term or even the idea, what 
Dornbusch and Scott call the "validity" of a normative order is 
sufficient (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975). Validity means essentially 
the existence of a binding normative order, as opposed to S's personal 
belief that it is right (which Dornbusch and Scott refer to as the 
order's propriety). Validity has the effect of inducing others to 
support such an order and inducing any particular individual to 
expect that other others will support it. In the equity experiment 
referred to in the second paragraph of this section, for example, 
post-session interviews found that S's did not personally believe in 
the legitimacy of the inequality created by the experiment. They 
felt the task was too simple to require much ability, hence did not 
see how the central position's superior ability could matter. But 
they did not attempt to change the structure of the communication 
system because they felt that, in an experiment, rules made by and 
beliefs held by E were valid, hence binding on them. Furthermore, 
they felt that in some sense E's authority backed the normative order 
(Lineweber, et al, 1930). Borrowing again from Dornbusch and Scott, 
we have found it a useful elaboration of Bachrach and Baratz to be 
more specific about who supports an order, hence to distinguish be­
tween "endorsement" and ,,authorization" of the validity of an order.
37.
By endorsement is meant the support of a normative order by others like S. 
By authorization is meant the support.of a normative order■by : others more 
powerful than S. Authorization, as we will see in a moment, has, a stron­
ger effect than endorsement but endorsement is a critical factor, never­
theless ; in the mobilization of revolutionary coalitions (see Lawler,
1975 liichener and 3urt , 1975. Itichener and Lawler, 1971. Ilichener and 
Lyons, 1972). To study its effects, a short questionnaire was adminis­
tered after one practice trial, the (fictitious) results of which were 
fed back to S!s who were told that four of the five members of the group 
felt that the wheel was the most appropriate and most efficient way to 
organize the group for its task. This had the effect of delaying or 
preventing 49% of the change found in the baseline (Walker, 1979 Walker 
and Smitn-Donals, 1931 Walker et al., 1931).
To study the effects of authorized power, E gave the central position 
the power to decide•, as it saw fit. how to divide team earnings. Although 
Bachrach and Baratz discuss power a good deal, and have what we believe 
to be one of the better analyses of its different forms (1963 1970, ch.2), 
it is important to keep in mind that what they are talking about is almost 
never pure power. They are almost always talking about nouer backed by 
legitimating values, rules, beliefs, practices and procedures. The impor­
tance of this, in their analysis (as in many others), is that it confers 
the capacity to mobilize collective resources which, once assembled, con­
centrates sufficient power to back rules by sanctions. It is, therefore, 
not necessary that any particular individual accept the propriety of an 
order if he is aware that it is authorized; hence backed by the assembled 
resources of the community. What E did by delegatin, the right to divide 
team earnings to the center was therefore to authorize its power, in the 
Dornbusch-Scott sense. But., following Bachrach and Baratz, what x?e were
concerned with was the more invisible ways in which this power might 
operate to delay or prevent change. Their analysis rests on two ideas•
That potential power is as or more more important than actual pox^ er and 
operates to produce its effects through the :ilaw of anticipated reactions'1 
(Friedrich, 1963). E therefore informed S that past experience shox^ ed 
that the person in the central position preferred centralized communication 
netx-rorks and almost always used his poxier to prevent change. The expected 
value of his sanction, had it been used־ xras greater than the expected 
value of the gain S xrould derive from a change, but the central position 
neither used nor threatened to use any actual sanctions. The reactions 
anticipated by S nevertheless delayed or prevented 60% of the change 
found in the baseline (Ford, 1901). Virtually the same effect, hox^ ever, 
xjas found xtfhen S had no clear idea what the person in the central position 
preferred or hox? likely he was to deploy the sanctions he controlled. 
Uncertainty about the central position's preferences was created by infor­
ming S that, based on past experiments one could not tell how the person 
in the central position would behave because some factors led him to 
prefer the wheel (such as the responsibility) but some led him to prefer 
a change (such as the inequality). Uncertainty about the position's 
preferences delayed or prevented 53% of the change found in the baseline 
(Zelditch and Ford, 1930).°
IV. Conclusions.
The first conclusion to draxj from these experiments is that legiti­
macy is not reducible to a purely material basis. Ho one experiment is 
sufficient evidence against a whole way of thought and we did not even 
try to test the theory of norm-formation that is at the heart of this way
of thought, but we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
"mobilization of bias: depends on a vested interest. The same :'bias" 
was mobilized without such an interest and its effect was independent of 
the existence of such an interest.
But, second, the evidence clearly supported all six of the hypotheses 
tested about the effects Bachrach and Baratz claim that the ,'mobilization 
of bias" has on the mobilization of discontent. If the existing system of 
inequality was justified by a legitimate source, if an issue would clearly 
damage legitimate objectives, if change was politically impossible, if 
peers endorsed the existing system, if authorized powers, preferred ;Lt, 
or even if the preferences of such powers were uncertain but they could 
do serious damage— all these conditions delayed or prevented change.
A third conclusion one can draw from these experiments is that 
Bachrach and Baratz seem if anything to have understated the features 
that make metadecisions and nondecisions special. What makes a meta­
decision different from a decision is that one of its alternatives is to 
do nothing. A decision is a choice among possible policies: if one 
chooses a policy x one at the same time rejects a policy and, 
whichever of the two one chooses, the outcome is a visible commitment to 
some policy. A metadecision is a choice between doing something and doing 
nothing, but to do nothing nay or may not be a visible commitment. There 
are two distinct ways of doing nothing: one can decide not to decide 
something, such as tabling a motion or one can simply not decide to 
decide, evading the issue altogether. The significance of the difference 
between the two kinds of nondecision is that it makes nondecisions in an 
important sense beyond compliance. For the most part, Bachrach and Baratz 
reason from specifically anticipated reactions to specifically compliant
actions. But coMpl-Lancc isu't loquJred lo noudccide an issue. Doing 
nothing is as likely to occur when the preferences of the powerful are 
uncertain. In this respect, the legitimacy of power works in much the 
same way as the legitimacy of a normative order. As Bachrach and Baratz 
would have predicteds we found that norms do not depend for their effect 
on their acceptance by any particular individual. 'Acceptance‘ is a 
collective, not an individual process, and the acceptance of a normative 
order by some suffices to mobilize collective resources behind its enf°rce~ 
ment on those who do not accept it. In other words, it is sufficient that 
a normative order exist. In the same way, the sheet existence of a power 
structure, over and above any specifically anticipated reactions is 
sufficient to nondecide an issue.
What emerges from these experiments is a somewhat more thorough­
going structuralism than Bachrach and Baratz's. Bachrach and Baratz׳s 
theory is "structural" in the sense that issueness depends neither on the 
correlation between individual discontent and collective action, on the 
one hand, nor on the correlation between individual acceptance of rules 
and compliance with them on the other. It is the social distribution of 
resources (including access). operating through the dual mobilization of 
A and B, not discontent, that determines challenge and the existence of a 
normative order in the system as a whole. not the beliefs of particular 
actors, that determines nondecisions. But their structural approach breaks 
down at two crucial points: they mean ״mobilization;i of bias quite 
literally, thinking throughout in terms of specific, concrete acts by A, 
that have a centrally coordinated, intended outcome. And the effects of 
this bias are often thought of as event-specific, as motivated compliance 
by B with the specific wishes of A. What one sees in our experiments is
somewhat different: nothing in our research speaks to the question of 
how a structure emerges, but once it emerges its operation does not depend 
on concrete suppression by A nor concrete compliance by 3. Nondecisions 
are as much the outcome of the structure of the AB relation as of A's 
intentions or 3:s anticipations. The mobilization of bias arises as much 
from the existence of a normative order asiit does from any specific acts 
by A;, its effects on B arise from the collective acceptance of that order, 
not acceptance by any particular B, and the effects of authorized power 
arise as much from the sheer existence of a structure of power as from 
the anticipation of concrete reactions by B. Ilence, it does not require 
a conspiracy by A to mobilize bias and its effects do not depend on how 
the rules were made. Nondecisions are as much the outcome of the way a 
system is organized as of concrete actions by particular actors.
FOOTilOTES
*Bachrach and Baratz did not actually define ''nondecisionmaking5' 
explicitly until Power and Poverty and even then they gave two conflicting 
definitions of it. Hence, any discussion of the concept must reconstruct 
their meaning from the surrounding commentary and their methods of 
reasoning.
We define "issueness" in terms of outcomes and do not try to clarify 
further the meaning of differences among alternative ways of achieving 
any given outcome although we recognize that "issues" arise with respect 
to procedure and/or strategy also. For the sake of simplicity, two 
strategies that yield the same outcome are formally equivalent. What 
often causes problems for such an analysis are multi-attribute outcomes, 
i.e., outcomes that can be ranked according to two or more dimensions. 
Hence, what creates issues are often different evaluations of various 
trade-offs possible among different policies. For our purposes, different 
orderings of the different aspects of an outcome create an issue.
3The baseline rate of change in a sixth baseline, part of an experiment in 
which change was made politically impossible, was significantly lower 
than the pooled average shown in figure 3, reflecting the effects of 
inflation on the amount of money at stake in the experiment.
4A more detailed analysis shows that, if anything, the interaction of 
interest and legitimacy produces less change than would be predicted by 
adding their independent effects, an important result that we do not 
pause to explain because it adds nothing to the test of Bachrach and 
Baratz's theory. See Zelditch, et al., 1931.
The essential feature of methods for treating survival curves is that 
observed change is coinnared to expected change at each trial (or period), 
which in turn depends only on the number exposed to risk at the begin­
ning of each trial. If m S’s make a C-response at trial _t and a 
proportion 2. °f S's were in condition when trial jt began, 
then the expected number of C-responses in condition i should be 
. assuming there is no true difference between conditions. The 
quantity r^ = , the ratio of the observed to the expected number
of change-responses, gives the relative rate of change in the i.th con­
dition:, i.e., the rate of change in the jLth condition compared to that
in the population as a whole. The quantity R = r,/r. gives the ratioA 1
of the relative rate of change in the ith condition to that in the jth
condition— reflecting the shape of the two curves because the expected
values are computed trial by trial and are based on the numbers surviving
up to the time each trial begins. The quantity £> = 1 - R provides
essentially the same information, but has a more natural interpretation
in the present case as the ’1suppression" rate, i.e., the rate at which
change in the baseline is delayed or prevented by any given experimental
2treatment. The statistic (0 - E) /E, furthermore, is distributed as 
chi square with (in this case) 1 df, which is the basis for the signifi­
cance levels in the notes to table 2. For a comprehensive survey of 
methods of analysing survival curves, see Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 
1980. An especially clear and nontechnical treatment, based on the 
(nonparametric) "logrank" statistic which is used here, can be found in 
Peto, et al., 1977.-
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5
Two explanations of this result seemed plausible: That the situation 
was so obviously to the center's advantage that many S's still believed 
he would prefer it, despite the instruction by E; or that under uncer­
tainty S's minimize the worst that could happen by doing nothing.
(Cf any game-theoretic discussion of the minimax principle.) A survey 
of an independent sample drawn from the same population found that if 
the situation were stripped of all cues from which to infer preferences, 
but there was still a good deal at stake, over half the respondents 
predicted that anyone else (though not they themselves) would do 
nothing, playing it safe. (See Zelditch and Ford, 1980.)
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Table 1. Proportion of chanp,e-responses made by agenda gatekeepers 




Statistics of the Logit analysis
Condition N Effect Parameter* Chi Square df Probability
Baseline 20 .95 Grand Mean 0.29 0.75 1 n.s.
Interest 20 .60 Interest -0.96 3.00 1 p < .005
Legitimacy 23 .35 Legitimacy -1.33 16.64 1 p < .001
Interaction 20 .15 Interaction 0.31 0.85 1 n.s.
* These estimates are the logs of the ratio of the proportion endorsing to the 
proportion not endorsing change.
Source: Zelditch, et al., 1931.
Table 2. Per cent of the baseline rate of change initiated by peripheral
positions that is delayed or prevented by various manipulations 
of legitimacy and power.a
Experimental Condition N
Per cent of baseline 
rate of change  ^
delayed or prevented
Inequality is justified by differences in 
relative contributions to the task 21 63%**
Change would damage the objectives of the 
experiment 31 67%**
Collective change is politically 
impossible 20 43%
Peers believe that the existing structure of 
the communication system is appropriate 4> o o 49%**
A power legitimated by E prefers the exist­
ing communication system 24 60%*
A power legitimated by E could sanction S 
if he preferred the existing system 24 58%**
Sources: Line 1 is from Lineweber, et al., 198 
1980; line 3 from Thomas, et al., 1981 
Smith-Donals, 1981: line 5 from Ford,
0; line 2 from Thomas, et al, 
; line 4 from Walker and 
1981; and line 6 is from
Zelditch and Ford, 1930.
a The rate of change includes both individualistic and collective change- 
responses in all experiments. See Note 5 for the method by which the 
"per cent of change delayed or prevented" is computed.
b There are small changes in procedure from experiment to experiment, but 
each comparison is made to an exactly similar baseline.
c Pooled data from two experiments. After being run with males, the same 
condition was replicated on females. There were no differences by sex.
* P < .05
** P < .01
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Figure la. The principal stages of the policy process,
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Figure lb. The stages of predecision politics.
Figure 2. Most and Least Centralized Communication Networks 
possible in the Experinent.
Figure 2b. An "All-to-All" 
Network. All positions have 
equal access to all infor­
mation.
Figure 2a. Bavelas's "Wheel". 
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Figure 3. Mean survival curve, shoxjjng the baseline rate of change 
for S׳s in the peripheral positions of centralized com-, 
munication networks, for 111 subjects in 5 experiments..
